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Bush v. Gore: What Happened, and What Does The
Supreme Court's New Equal Protection Standard Mean
for State Election Officials?
Michael Louis Newman*
Benjamin Franklin once mocked the property ownership requirement
for voting by stating:
Today, a man owns a jackass worth fifty dollars and he
is entitled to vote; but before the next elections, the
jackass dies. The man in the mean time has become
more experienced, his knowledge of the principles of
government, and his acquaintance with mankind, are
more extensive, and he is therefore better qualified to
make a proper selection of rulers-but the jackass is dead
and the man cannot vote.'
"Now, gentlemen," Franklin then asked, "pray tell me, in whom is the
right of suffrage? In the man or in the jackass?"'2 According to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in its recent and instantly
infamous case of George W. Bush v. Albert Gore (hereinafter "Bush v.
Gore"),3 the right to vote is vested in neither of the two beings Franklin
suggested.4 Rather, the state legislature, acting pursuant to the United
States Constitution, 5 has the sole right to decide how a state's
presidential election will be administered. 6 With a few glaring historical
exceptions, 7 the apparatus for selecting presidents utilizing the electoral
college has worked exceedingly well, with the state legislatures
delegating the power to administer elections to state election officials
operating under the auspices of the executive branches of state
* J.D., 2002 Graduate, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE CASKET, OR FLOWERS OF LITERATURE, WIT AND SENTIMENT
4 (Philadelphia, 1828); reprinted in ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2000).
2. Id
3. George W. Bush and Richard Cheney v. Albert Gore, Jr. and Joseph Lieberman, 531
U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter "Bush v. Gore"].
4. Id. at 104.
5. U.S. CONST., art. IH, cl. 2.
6. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.
7. See Part III, infra.
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governments. 8
In the 210 years since the first Supreme Court convened, the Court
had never, before December 12, 2000, selected the President of the
United States. On that date, the Court set forth a new interpretation of
the Equal Protection clause as it applies to the administration of Federal
Elections by state elections officials. Over the next two years, in
preparation for the 2004 presidential elections, state officials must
interpret and apply this new standard to avoid any further legal or
political conflict. What must state elections officials do to comply with
this new standard? The purpose of this article is to highlight the role of
state elections officials historically and hypothesize the future
application of the Bush v. Gore Equal Protection standard in future
elections by state elections officials. Part II of this paper will review the
historical background of federal election administration by the states,
while part III will provide a brief history of American presidential
elections. In part IV, the facts behind the titular case of this article will
be discussed, and part V will be a discussion of the Supreme Court's
historic decision. Part VI will highlight the Court's new Equal
Protection doctrine. Finally, in part VII, I will discuss how the Court's
new standard will be applied to the administration of the 2004 election
and beyond.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN
GENERAL
At the time the Constitution was drafted, a debate raged in the
Continental Congress regarding how the President of the United States
should be elected in order to best represent the people.9 Four methods
for choosing the President were debated, but ultimately rejected. 10 The
first method was to allow Congress to select the President, but this
method was thought to be too divisive and undermined the separation of
powers principles of the Constitution."I The second method was to
allow the state legislatures to make the selection, but the drafters feared
this method would result in a national executive that would be beholden
8. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 329-30 (2000).
9. WILLIAM KIMBERLING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 2 (A history of the Electoral
College), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
10. Id.
1 1.Id.
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to the states. 12 The third method was to elect the President by direct
national election. 3 However, this method was rejected due to the
likelihood that too many candidates would garner enough votes to
render the eventual plurality 'winner' illegitimate.1 4 The fourth method
was to institute an indirect election with each state represented by
electors who would then directly vote for President. 15
The Electoral College was therefore a compromise solution, giving
the smaller, less politically powerful states the ability to check the
influence of the very large and powerful states.16 The drafters of the
Constitution felt that their ingenious creation of the Electoral College
was among the most significant accomplishments of the Continental
Congress. 17 Alexander Hamilton begins The Federalist No. 68, The
Mode of Electing the President, by gleefully, almost boastfully,
explaining:
The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the
United States is almost the only part of the system, of
any consequence, which has escaped without severe
censure or which has received the slightest mark of
approbation from its opponents .... I venture somewhat
further and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it
be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an
imminent degree all the advantages the union of which
was to be desired. It was desirable that the sense of the
people should operate in the choice of the person to
whom so important a trust as to be confided. This end
will be answered by committing the right of making it,
not to any pre-established body, but to men chosen by
the people for the special purpose, and at the particular
conjuncture .... All these advantages will be happily
combined in the plan devised by the convention; which
is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of
persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and
representatives of such State in the national government
who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some
fit person as President. 18
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Idat 3.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
18. Id.
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Hamilton felt that "[t]his process of election affords a moral certainty
that the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who
has not in an imminent degree endowed with the requisite
qualifications." 19 The national legislature mostly ignored the process of
presidential elections, with a few notable exceptions where the Congress
was called upon to decide elections in case of a tie.20 "The founding
fathers, in writing the Constitution, declined to institute any national
suffrage standard at all: for pragmatic political purposes of their own,
they left to the states the power to determine the contours of the
franchise."'2' Indeed, in the more than 200 years since the drafting of the
Constitution, "[t]he right of Americans to vote [has been] shaped by an
historically evolved and somewhat jerry-rigged-amalgam of state and
federal laws."'22 Federal laws have formed a backbone of limitations on
state abuses of administrative discretion, such as discrimination at the
polling place on the basis of race or gender, but state laws have filled in
the details regarding the administration of elections, and state officials
have the task of carrying out the actual process of electing the
President: 23
Administrative law is the legal branch that controls the
administrative functions of the government by ensuring
that agencies exercise their powers within their legal
limits, while additionally protecting citizens against any
abuse of agency powers. Congress and State legislatures
promulgate and define the administrative agency as
strictly a legislative creature .... 24
The founders clearly intended that the states have an active role in
deciding presidential elections. The founders stated, "[t]he election of
19. Id
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). The votes of the electors were to be
transmitted to the Congress:
[A]nd the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of
votes will be President. But as a majority of the votes might not always
happen to center on one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a
majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the
House of Representatives shall elect out of the candidates who shall have the
five highest number of votes the man who in their opinion may be best
qualified for the office.
Id; see also Part 11, infra.
2 1. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 329.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Heather Rutland, Civil Rights are Civil Rights are Civil Rights: The Inapplicability of
Preclusion to Unreviewed State Administrative Decisions, 20 J.NAALJ 210 (Fall 2000).
the President ... will depend, in all cases, on the legislatures of the
several States. '25 "Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the
President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must, in all
cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most
cases, of themselves determine it."'26 Indeed, the process by which a
President is elected has always been decided, state-by-state, by the state
legislatures. In fact, when the 2000 election spiraled out of control in
Florida, there was serious consideration given by the Bush camp to
lobby the Florida Legislature to select the state's electors without
attaining a final vote count, effectively short-circuiting the process.27
"What counts, [John Yoo, University of California at Berkeley Law
Professor] and others maintained, is that the Legislature has the power to
[choose a slate of electors], regardless of what the final, official vote
count and regardless of state legal process that might produce twenty-
five Al Gore electors." 28
In McPherson v. Blacker,29 an 1892 case cited frequently throughout
the 2000 Election litigation, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
a Michigan legislative enactment that allowed state election
administrators to hold the election of presidential electors for the state of
Michigan in differing manners in the several districts in the state. 30 The
Court held that the Constitution mandated that it is for "the legislature
exclusively to define the method of effecting" the appointment of
presidential electors. 31 The Court explained that the legislature of each
state has the "plenary authority to direct the manner of appointment" of
electors32 because the framers of the Constitution specifically granted
them this power.33 This case formed an important underpinning of the
system we utilize today, as in the case, the Supreme Court gave the
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
27. John Yoo, A Legislature's Duty, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 2000, at A24, reprinted
in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 224 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. and
William Kristol, eds., Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
28. Thomas Oliphant, Gov. Bush's Cynical End-Around in the Florida Legislature,
Boston Globe, Dec. 3, 2000, at D8, reprinted in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE
COMMENTARY 238, 240 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Kristol, eds., Brookings Institution
Press, 2001).
29. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
30. Id. at 1; see also Brief for Petitioners, George W. Bush and Richard Cheney at 19-20,
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949).
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 25.
33. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, cI. 2: "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct ... 
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legislatures of the several states very broad authority to decide the
manner in which electors for President are chosen and delegate the
authority for administering elections as they see fit. 34
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONTESTED FEDERAL PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS
The Election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800
In the election of 1800, incumbent Federalist President John Adams,
successor to our first President, faced Republican Thomas Jefferson for
the second time.35  The Republican party won the election. 36 The
Republicans in the Electoral College split their votes evenly, which
resulted in a tie for President between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron
Burr. 37 The crisis moved to the House of Representatives. 38 In the case
of ties in the Electoral College, the House of Representatives has the
responsibility of choosing a President from the top five vote-getters. 39
Federalists in Congress, "desiring to embarrass Jefferson voted for Burr,
forcing the ballot 35 times over six days. '40 Finally, a group of fellow
congressman convinced Alexander Hamilton to switch his vote and
support Jefferson. This broke the tie, making Jefferson the third
President of the United States.4'
34. Id at 26.
35. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 556-62 (Simon & Schuster, 2001).
36. Id.
37. THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, TALLY OF THE 1824
ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE, at http://www.nara.gov/education/cc/electcol.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter NARA].
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, cl. 3.
39. Id.
40. NARA, supra note 37, at http://www.nara.gov/education/cc/electcol.html (last visited
March 20, 2002).
41. Id NARA describes the election as follows:
The election of 1800 had several lasting effects on the Electoral College
system. It was the first time that a two-candidate ticket was promoted by a
party, as well as the beginning of the practice of nominating electors who
pledged to automatically vote the party ticket. This new development was
directly opposed to the framers' original version of the electors as "free
agents"' or informed, respectable, independent citizens from each state. By
1804, the 12th Amendment was passed, making up for the weakness in the
original Clause 3. Never again would such a tie be possible, as separate
ballots would now be cast for president and vice-president.
Id.; see also TREASURES OF CONGRESS: THE HOUSE SELECTS A PRESIDENT,
available at http://www.nara.gov/exhall/treasuresofcongress/page_7.html# (last
visited March 20, 2002).
The Election of John Quincy Adams in 182442
In the election of 1824, several major candidates ran and split the vote
so that no single candidate managed to garner the requisite number of
electoral votes. 43  The Republican party, through a secret caucus,
nominated William H. Crawford. However, the majority of the party
gave its support to others, including Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and
John Quincy Adams.an In the presidential election, Andrew Jackson
garnered 40.3% of the national popular vote and more electoral votes
than any of the other candidates. 45 But because Jackson did not achieve
the requisite number of electoral votes, the election was thrown into the
House of Representatives. 46 Henry Clay supported John Quincy Adams
in the House by pledging his electors to Adams and Adams won the
election. 47
The Election of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876
In the election of 1876, an ally of Rutherford B. Hayes spread rumors
that Hayes won the electoral vote even though it is likely that he did not
garner the required number of votes while his opponent, Samuel Tilden,
did.48 The root of the problem was rampant "fraud, violence, and
intimidation" by both Democrats and Republicans, especially in Florida,
Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina.49 With no statutes setting
formal resolution procedures and no state officials responsible for
election administration, chaos ensued.50 Hayes earned 165 electoral
votes, Tilden earned 184, and each candidate claimed the 20 disputed
42. Bruce Morton, US. Has Survived Disputed Elections Before, at
httpJ/www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLrTICS/stories/I 1/09/morton.transition/index.html (last
visited March 20, 2002).
43. NARA, supra note 37, at http//www.nara.gov/education/cc/electcol.html (last visited
March 20, 2002).
44. Id. Under the current system, most states make their presidential nominations in
primary general elections, though a very small minority still use the process of nominating
conventions. Id
45. Id.
46. Id
47. Id. ("While he was never able to prove any actual bribery or corruption occurred, the
accusation endured and influenced the next election, as well as Clay's political career.").
48. Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center, Disputed Election of 1876, available at
http://www.rbhayes.org/dispute.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002) (excerpt of ARI
HoOGENBooM, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES: WARRIOR AND PRESIDENT, Chapter 17 (1995)).
49. Id.
50. Id
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votes which were needed to win. 51 Each party jockeyed for position.
The election finally fell to Hayes after back-room political negotiating. 52
Instead of strict adherence to the Constitutional process utilized in the
1800 or 1824 elections, the politicians of 1876 created an Electoral
Commission, composed of fifteen members, including five Senators,
five Representatives, and five Supreme Court Justices. 53 With the votes
on the commission split evenly between seven Democrats and seven
Republicans, Justice Joseph P. Bradley decided to cast his vote for the
Republicans, thus giving the presidency to Rutherford Hayes. 54
Congress responded to this crisis with the Electoral Count Act of
1887. 55 The Act designated states, "through 'judicial' or other means,"
as the primary jurisdiction in which to settle legal election contests. 56
Should a dispute be unresolved at the state level, "Congress is the body
primarily authorized to resolve remaining disputes. '57 According to
Justice Breyer in his dissent in Bush v. Gore, "[t]he legislative history of
the Act makes clear its intent to commit the power to resolve such
disputes to Congress, rather than the courts. ' 58 Indeed, the Electoral
Count Act seems to indicate an early move toward removing the power
of adjudication of election controversies from the courts and firmly
placing it within the jurisdiction of the legislatures, with the last resort
being not the Supreme Court, but the National Legislature:
The interests of all the States in their relations to each
other in the Federal Union demand that the ultimate
tribunal to decide upon the election of President should
be a constituent body, in which the States in their federal
relationships and the people in their sovereign capacity
should be represented. Under the Constitution who else
could decide? Who is nearer to the State in determining
a question of vital importance to the whole union of
States than the constituent body upon whom the
Constitution has devolved the duty to count the vote? 59
Despite the clear intention early on to place the duty of resolving
51. Id
52. Id
53. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 156(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, and 15 (2002).
56. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id
58. Id.
59. 18 CONG. REC. 30-31 (1886) (remarks of Representative Caldwell, sponsor of the
Electoral Count Act, upon introducing the Bill in the House of Representatives).
post-election disputes in the legislative branch, the states and the federal
government have together allowed a patchwork of state regulations to
crop up in the 125 years since the election dispute of 1876. These
regulations lead to a body of case law waiting for a close election to
touch off a judicial-legislative controversy over the resolution of
electoral disputes, and the 2000 election looked, even before election
day, like that kind of an election.
IV. THE FACTS BEHIND BUSH V. GORE
The election of 2000 was a very close race down to the wire.60 In
fact:
Everyone knew it was going to be close. For weeks the
two major-party candidates for president, Republican
governor George W. Bush of Texas and Democratic vice
president Al Gore, had been running neck and neck in
national polls. Most showed Bush ahead by a few
percentage points; two polls had Gore ahead; all were
within the statistical margin of error. The cover of
Newsweek magazine's pre-election special issue featured
a single-word headline: "Cliffhanger." More important
than these national opinion polls, however, were polls
showing how close the vote would be in the Electoral
College. The candidates had comfortable leads in many
states, but too many states were just too close to call, and
neither candidate had a predictable majority of these
crucial votes... most press accounts assumed that the
presidency would be decided in... "battleground" states
- Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Florida. 61
On election night, the television networks set up their familiar
scenario for monitoring exit polls, spot polls of a randomly selected
group of voters at randomly selected precincts in a state, and projecting
a winner of a state's electoral votes just after polls close and several
hours before state vote tallies became final. 62 "At 7:50 P.M., after the
polls had closed throughout most of Florida but while polls were still
60. Keating Holland, Tracking Poll: Bush leads Gore by 5 Points, 2 days before election
(Nov. 5, 2000), available at http:www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/I 1/05/
tracking.poll/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
61. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED 17 (The Univ. of Chicago Press
2001).
62. Associated Press, Flubs Put Spotlight on How Networks Call Elections (Nov. 17,
2000), available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/I 1/17/vns.ap/
index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
Snrin 2002 Bush v. Gore
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open in the western portion of the state's panhandle . . ., the Associated
Press and the television networks declared that Gore was the projected
winner of the state."' 63 As more and more states seemed to fall into the
Gore column of electoral wins and the media began to predict a Gore
win, Bush went on the air to explain that he thought the Florida call was
too early and that "Americans ought to wait until they count all the
votes" before celebrating a Gore win. 64 Later during election night, the
tide turned when "the media took the unprecedented step of withdrawing
their earlier projection of a Gore victory in Florida" and stated that the
vote count in Florida was too close to call. 65 As the night wore on, it
became clear that Florida's twenty-five electoral votes would determine
the outcome of the presidential election of 2000.66 At 2:16 A.M., the
networks began to call Florida in favor of Bush after more precinct
results poured in indicating an expanding Bush lead.67 After Gore
privately conceded to Bush, and as he prepared to make his public
concession speech, his campaign manager William Daley received a
message that the vote tally narrowed again, and that Gore should not
make a concession. 68 The networks placed Florida back into the "too
close to call" column, and Gore called Bush back to retract his private
concession, explaining that Florida state law required a recount of the
ballots and "[he] was going to wait it out."'69 Indeed, Bush's lead
continued to shrink in recounts over the next few days until the margin
of victory was too close to be decisive, and the campaign foes turned
into post-campaign combatants. 70
In order to ascertain a winner, Florida's seemingly simple post-
election recount mechanism was put into action. Florida has a typical
format for deciding the appointment of electors to represent the state in
the Electoral College. Under Florida's statutory administrative scheme,
the Secretary of State is the "chief election officer," and has the
responsibility to "[o]btain and maintain uniformity in the application,
operation, and interpretation of the election laws."'71 Under this scheme,
63. GILLMAN, supra note 61, at 18.
64. Id. at 18-19 (citing Mark Z. Barabak, Candidates Struggle for Bare Margin of
Victory, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at A21). Time is Eastern Standard Time.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id
67. Id. Time is Eastern Standard Time.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 19-20.
70. ld. at 20.
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.012 (West Supp. 2002).
the Secretary has delegated to individual county canvassing boards the
traditional duties of administering elections.7 2  Under the Florida
Supreme Court's ruling in Boardman v. Esteva,73 deference is to be
given to decisions by the executive branch, specifically the Florida
Elections Canvassing Commission. 74 The Boardman court stated that
"[t]he election process ... is committed to the executive branch of
government through duly designated officials all charged with specific
duties .... [The] judgments [of these officials] are entitled to be
regarded by the courts as presumptively correct .... 75
Under Florida's statutory scheme, the county canvassing boards
conduct a mandatory recount wherever the margin of victory in a race is
one half of one percent or less of all legally cast votes.76 Following the
final vote tabulation, the county canvassing boards, to fit within a so-
called "safe-harbor" provision, must file certified results of the vote
tabulation with the Department of State by five o'clock p.m., on the
seventh day after the election.77 The state Canvassing Commission must
then certify the results of the counties. 78 As in all states, the state
legislature has enacted provisions governing the methods for
challenging both election returns79 and the certified results of an
election 80
Under a protest, which must be filed prior to the certification of
election results, 81 the county canvassing board has the discretion to
allow a manual recount. 82 If a sample recount shows an error in
tabulation, three options are allowed for the county administrators.
83
First, they can attempt to correct the error and then recount the
remaining precincts with the same vote tabulation mechanisms.
84
Second, they can request that the Florida Department of State verify the
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141 (West Supp. 2001) (amended 2002).
73. 323 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
74. Id. at 268, n. 5.
75. Id
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4) (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.112(1) (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002). Time is Eastern
Standard Time.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111(1) (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(b) (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(c) (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2000) (amended 2002).
84. Id.
Bush v. Gore
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tabulation mechanisms. 85 Finally, they have the option of manually
recounting all of the ballots. 86
Florida's election dispute machinery creaked into motion on the day
after the election, November 9, 2000, with a statewide machine recount
giving Bush an official lead of 327 votes, with 2,910,198 votes to
Gore's 2,909,871 votes. 87 After the release of those official totals, Gore
sought manual recounts in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and
Volusia counties. 88 Bush reacted to this by requesting, on November 11,
that a Federal District Court block all manual recounts. 89 This request
was denied on November 13.90 In a series of Advisory Legal Opinions
regarding the legality of the recount process, Director of the Division of
Elections of the State of Florida, L. Clayton Roberts, established a
deadline for certification of all votes of November 14,91 defined the
official description of an error in tabulation,92 and set forth procedures
for manual recounting and partial certification of county returns. 93 In
order to rectify what he saw as an opinion "so clearly at variance with
the existing Florida statutes and case law," Florida Attorney General
Robert Butterworth issued his own official Advisory Opinion to a judge
considering one of the recount cases. 94
In the first case addressing the manual recounting, a Leon County
Circuit Court judge, Terry Lewis, issued a declaratory judgment on
November 14 that Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris could
certify the vote totals of each of the counties involved in the manual
85. Id.
86.Id. The procedures for a manual recount are set forth in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(7)
(West 2000) (amended 2002).
87. BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY xi (E.J. Dionne, Jr. &
William Kristol eds., 2001).
88. Id.
89. Id at xii.
90. Id.
91. Florida Department of State Division of Elections Advisory Opinion DE 00-10:
Deadline for Certification on County Results, reprinted in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES
AND THE COMMENTARY 9 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol, eds., 2001).
92. Florida Department of State Division of Elections Advisory Opinion DE 00-11:
Definitions of Errors in Vote Tabulation, reprinted in BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND
THE COMMENTARY 11 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001).
93. Florida Department of State Division of Elections Advisory Opinion DE 00-13:
Manual Recount Procedures and Partial Certification of County Returns, reprinted in BUSH
v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 12 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol
eds., 2001).
94. Florida Attorney General Advisory Legal Opinion AGO 2000-65: Manual recount of
ballots, error in voter tabulation, reprinted in BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE
COMMENTARY 14 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001).
recount, but that the counties could amend their vote totals at the
discretion of Harris when she certified the statewide vote totals. 95 Harris
immediately certified the then-current county totals and issued a set of
criteria for allowing extensions that included voter fraud, failure to
comply with election procedures and acts of nature and excluding
extensions where the delay resulted from voter error, confusing ballots,
and "where there is nothing more than a mere possibility that the
outcome of the election would have been effected.
96
After concluding their manual recounts, Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm
Beach, and Volusia county submitted requests to amend their previously
certified totals pursuant to Judge Lewis's order, 97 but Secretary Harris
rejected all four counties based on her belief that none complied with
her set of criteria. 98 Gore immediately requested that Judge Lewis hold
Harris in contempt of court, but Lewis ruled that Harris has "exercised
her reasoned judgment to determine what relevant factors and criteria
should be considered .... 99 The Florida Supreme Court then reversed
Lewis and Harris and on November 21, 2000, they imposed a November
26 deadline for manual recounts and ordered that Harris accept all
manual recount totals submitted prior to the new deadline.' 00 The
November 26 certification showed Bush leading by a total of 537 votes
and Harris declared Bush the winner of Florida's twenty-five electoral
votes and therefore the presidency. 10 1  Bush appealed the Florida
Supreme Court's decision to the United States Supreme Court, but the
Court remanded the case for further consideration on the issue of Florida
state law, refusing to directly reinterpret the Florida court's
interpretation of its own state laws and denying Bush the relief he had
requested.102 The certification of November 26 therefore stood as
official, and the Gore team focused on the next phase of the legal battle,
the contest.
As in most states, to challenge the certification of an election in
95. McDermott v. Harris, No. CV 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
14, 2000).
96. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227 n.5 (Fla. 2000).
97. McDermott v. Harris, No. CV 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
14, 2000).
98. See Florida Department of State Division of Elections Advisory Opinion DE 00-11:
Deadline for Certification on County Results, supra note 92.
99. DIONNE, JR. & KRISTOL, supra note 87, at xii.
100. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1240.
101. DIONNE, JR. & KRISTOL, supra note 87, at xiii.
102. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
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Florida, a contest must be filed in a circuit court, 103 with the local
canvassing board or state canvassing board as the party defendant.10 4 To
establish grounds for a contest, the challenger must show the "[r]eceipt
of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes
sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election."' 05 To
this end, "[t]he circuit judge to whom the contest is presented may
fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each
allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to
prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief
appropriate under such circumstances." 10 6
In his concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore, Justice Rehnquist states,
"[i]n [p]residential elections, the contest period necessarily terminates
on the date set by [Congress] for concluding the State's 'final
determination' of 'election controversies."' 107  Title 3, Chapter 1,
Section 5 of the United States Code, entitled "Determination of
controversy as to appointment of electors," states:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to
the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its
final determination of any controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors
of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures,
and such determination shall have been made at least six
days before the time fixed for the meeting of the
electors, such determination made pursuant to such law
so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior
to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be
conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as
hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the
electors appointed by such State is concerned. 08
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(1) (West 2000) (amended 2002).
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(4) (West 2000) (amended 2002).
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West 2000) (amended 2002).
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West 2000) (amended 2002).
107. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 117 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing 3
U.S.C.A. § 5 (Supp. 2000)).
108. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2001). There are, at the time of writing, several pieces of legislation
pending in Congress attempting to amend this section, including Senate Bill 1320, which
attempts to change the date for federal elections and establish national polling hours; Senate
Bill 175, which attempts to set a uniform time for poll closing and regulate absentee ballot
counting; Senate Bill 50, which attempts to set a national poll closing time; and House
Resolution 50, a sister bill of Senate Bill 50, which similarly attempts to set a national poll
closing time. S. 1320, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 175, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 50, 107th Cong.
On November 27, the day after Secretary Harris certified the vote
totals and awarded Florida's electoral votes to Bush, Gore filed suit in
the Leon County courtroom of Judge N. Sanders Sauls contesting the
statewide certification and specifically challenging the vote totals in
Miami-Dade, Nassau, and Palm Beach counties. 109 Judge Sauls stated:
[I]t is the established law of the state of Florida, as
reflected in State v. Smith, that where changes or charges
of irregularity of procedure or inaccuracy of returns in
balloting and counting processes have been alleged, the
court must find as a fact that a legal basis for ordering
any recount exists before ordering such a recount.110
Judge Sauls then concluded that there was no such legal basis. 11 On
December 8, the Florida Supreme Court reversed Sauls, holding that
there was a factual and legal basis to order a recount because enough
ballots remained in dispute to sway the election to either Bush or
Gore.1 12 The Florida court ordered manual recounts to continue and
ordered Secretary of State Harris to include results from recounts in
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties in the state's certified vote
totals. '13
On December 9, the day after the Florida Supreme Court's final
ruling, the Supreme Court granted a request by the Bush legal team to
stay the Florida court's order. 114 In a highly unusual move, the Court
treated the application for a stay as a writ of certiorari, and then granted
this writ of certiorari, effectively summoning the parties to argue before
the Justices, despite the fact that neither party requested the ability to
conduct oral arguments before the Court.11 5 It was clear that battle lines
had already been drawn when one conservative, Justice Scalia, and one
liberal, Justice Stevens, each drafted an opinion to accompany the per
curiam grant of stay.116
Justice Scalia foreshadowed the final result, explaining, "the issuance
of the stay suggests that a majority of the Court, while not deciding the
(2001); H.R. 50, 107th Cong. (2001).
109. DIONNE, JR. & KRISTOL, supra note 87, at xiii.
110. Id. at 53-55 (published transcript of oral judgment in Gore v. Harris, No. CV 00-
2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000)).
111. Id. at 55.
112. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), cert. and stay granted, Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 1046 (2000), and rev'd, Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
113. Id. at 1262.
114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (application for stay of order).
115. Id.
116. See Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) and (Stevens J., dissenting).
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issues presented, believe that the petitioner has a substantial probability
of success." 117 Justice Scalia framed the legal question as "whether the
votes that have been ordered to be counted are, under a reasonable
interpretation of Florida law, 'legally cast votes,"' suggesting a federal
reinterpretation of a state court's interpretation of its own state laws.118
Justice Scalia further commented (as the Court would ultimately frame
its decision in Bush v. Gore) that he doubted the "constitutionality of
letting the standards for determination of voters' intent - dimpled chads,
hanging chads, etc. - vary from county to county, as the Florida
Supreme Court opinion... permits." 119
Justice Stevens, in a dissent to the Court's acceptance of the case for
oral arguments and determination, explained, "the majority has acted
unwisely," as it violates three "venerable rules of judicial restraint":
On questions of state law, we have consistently
respected the opinions of the highest courts of the States.
On questions whose resolution is committed at least in
large measure to another branch of the Federal
Government, we have construed our own jurisdiction
narrowly and exercised it cautiously. On federal
constitutional questions that were not fairly presented to
the court whose judgment is being reviewed, we have
prudently declined to express an opinion. 120
Justice Stevens emphasized that the Florida Supreme Court's ruling
was not only consistent with prior Florida case law, but was also
consistent with rulings in other states that upheld "the basic principle,
inherent in our Constitution and our democracy, that every legal vote
should be counted."' 21
V. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COuRT'S MANY DECISIONS
The Per Curiam Opinion
The per curiam opinion of the Court held that the manual ballot
tabulation did not satisfy the minimum requirements set forth by the
Equal Protection Clause. 22  The Court focused its review on the
117. Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000).
S 0G
question of "whether the Florida Supreme Court established new
standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply
with 3 U.S.C. § 5," and also "whether the use of standardless manual
recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses."'' 23 The
Court answered each of these questions by stating, "[w]ith respect to the
equal protection question, we find a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." 124
The Court began its analysis by sharply focusing blame for the
election fiasco on the punch-card balloting system, explaining
"punchcard balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of
ballots which are not punched in a clean, complete way by the voter." 125
The Court then entered into its discussion of the constitutional rights
involved by making the seemingly shocking assertion that "[t]he
individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote" unless
granted the privilege by his or her state legislature. 126 The Court cites to
an early case, McPherson v. Blacker,127 as stating that the power to
select electors for the President of the United States resides in the state
legislature, and only the legislature has the ability to grant the citizens of
a state the privilege of voting in a general election. 128 However, once
the legislature vests the right in the people of the state to vote, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 129 requires that a state not "value one person's vote over
that of another."1 30 The Court then focuses in on the Warren Court's
holding in Reynolds v. Sims 131 that "the right of suffrage can be denied
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." 132 The Court characterizes its deliberations in Bush v. Gore
as attempting to decide "whether the recount procedures the Florida
Supreme Court has adopted are consistent with its obligation to avoid
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id. at 104.
126. Id.
127. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
128. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
130. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 665 (1966)).
131. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
132. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
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arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate," 133
which was decried in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 134
The Court is compelled in its per curiam opinion to respond to an
extremely sensitive criticism in the wake of its acceptance of certiorari
of a case in which a state supreme court analyzed state statutes
governing the administration of elections in its own state, as this type of
analysis is nearly always given deference by the Court. 135 The Court
defends itself by explaining:
For purposes of resolving the equal protection challenge,
it is not necessary to decide whether the Florida Supreme
Court had the authority under the legislative scheme for
resolving election disputes to define what a legal vote is
and to mandate a manual recount implementing that
definition. The recount mechanisms implemented in
response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court
do not satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary
treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental
right. Florida's basic command for the count of legally
cast votes is to consider the "intent of the voter."'136
The Court explained that the issue is "not whether to believe a
witness but how to interpret the marks or holes or scratches on an
inanimate object, a piece of cardboard or paper which, it is said, might
not have registered as a vote during the machine count."' 137 To this end,
the Court explained that having various standards among the different
Florida counties, even among different vote-counters in each county,
was an unfair and disparate treatment of the rights of the voters. 138 The
per curiam opinion offered the example of one county involved in the
manual recount:
Palm Beach County, for example, began the process
with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting
completely attached chads, switched to a rule that
considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen
through a chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then
abandoned any pretense of a per se rule, only to have a
court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal.
133. Id. at 104-05 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)).
134. 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1996).
135. See infra note 213.
136. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06 (citing Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Ha.
2000)).
137. Id at 106.
138. Id. at 106-07.
This is not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal
treatment. 139
The final and critical rule of Bush v. Gore, as restated from Harper,40
is that, "[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State
may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's
vote over that of another."' 41  The Court therefore accuses the vote
counters in Florida of being inherently biased in their counting, or at
best, incapable of committing to a fair and equal treatment of each ballot
under one per se rule. The Court especially points to the inherent
unfairness of counting the "undervotes," or ballots on which a machine
tabulation recorded no vote for president, but not counting the
"overvotes," or ballots on which a machine tabulation recorded more
than one vote for President. 142
The Court concludes its remarkable opinion in a remarkable case with
a fittingly remarkable limitation of its decision when it stated that its
"consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem
of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities."' 143 The Court seems to worry about an application of the
principles it espoused in its Equal Protection discussion to other cases,
even ones involving factually similar disputes, despite its cryptic urging
earlier in the decision that pushes for a nationwide review of the voting
system: "After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies
nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and
machinery for voting."' 144
The Court finally discusses the impracticality of continuing vote
counts because of the extreme administrative pressures that would have
to be placed on elections officials in the state of Florida and the lack of
time. 145
139. Id.
140. Interestingly, Harper has nothing to do with the counting of votes, but rather the
creation on voting districts. In Harper, the Court rejected a gerrymandered voting district as
"inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1996).
141. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
142. Id. at 107-08.
143. Id. at 109.
144. Id at 104.
145. Id. at 110. The Court expressed concerns about time limiting the ability to redress
the injustices it claimed tainted the vote counting, yet inexplicably, when blaming Gore for
creating time constraints on the process by pressing a challenge to the certification of the
vote counts stated, "[t]he press of time does not diminish the constitutional concern." Id. at
108. The Court is therefore willing to take the time to hear the case and decide that the
actions taken in Florida were unconstitutional, but is not willing to make the time to properly
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The Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by fellow conservatives Scalia and
Thomas, wrote an opinion concurring with the per curiam opinion, and
immediately recognized that the nature of the disputed 2001 elections
was different from any previous case because it dealt with "an election
for the President of the United States."' 146
In order to explain its unusual decision to address an issue of state
law and its nearly unprecedented reversal of a state supreme court on a
matter of the interpretation of a state law, the conservative faction of the
Court put forth an explanation that began with a caveat:
In most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel
us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of
state law. That practice reflects our understanding that
the decisions of state courts are definitive
pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns.
Of course, in ordinary cases, the distribution of powers
among the branches of a State's government raises no
questions of federal constitutional law, subject to the
requirement that the government be republican in
character. But there are a few exceptional cases in
which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a
power on a particular branch of a State's government.
This is one of them. 147
The Chief Justice cited Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins148 for the
proposition that state court decisions on matters of state law and
administration should be given great deference by federal courts, but
immediately moved away from this deferential presumption by
explaining that, in the context of the appointment and election of
presidential electors, "the text of the election law itself, and not just its
interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent
significance."' 149 The concurrence recognizes that "Art. II, § 1, cl. 2,
'convey[s] the broadest power of determination' and 'leaves it to the
legislature exclusively to define the method' of appointment,"' 5 ° but that
in its decision in the case below, 151 the Florida Supreme Court made a
resolve the dispute.
146. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
149. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
150. Id
151. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000)
"significant departure from the legislative scheme for appointing
Presidential electors [that] presents a federal constitutional question."' 152
The concurrence noted that the Florida Legislature decided prior to
the November 6, 2000, election date to hold a statewide election for the
state's 25 electors, and that the Legislature further "delegated the
authority to run the elections and to oversee election disputes to the
Secretary of State, and to state circuit courts." 153 The concurrence then
states that, though certain areas of the code are subject to interpretation
by either the Secretary of State or by the state courts, "the general
coherence of the legislative scheme may not be altered by judicial
interpretation so as to wholly change the statutorily provided
apportionment of responsibility among these various bodies."' 154 Justice
Rehnquist asserts that, though a state court may use its own discretion in
deciding the level of deference it would give to the Secretary of State in
a state election, the United States Constitution requires that the courts
"must be both mindful of the legislature's role under Article II in
choosing the manner of appointing electors and deferential to those
bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to carry out its
constitutional mandate." 155
The concurrence then made its own interpretation of Florida election
law and addressed the administrative law implications of the protest and
contest phases. 156 The critical issue, according to the concurrence, was
one of oversight by the Florida courts of the administration of the
election by the State Secretary of State, Katherine Harris. 157 In the first
Florida Supreme Court case to address the protest phase, 158 the Florida
justices extended the certification deadline established by the Florida
Legislature. 159 Justice Rehnquist surmises that there was implicit value
placed on the certification action taken by the Secretary of State if
justice required an extension of the deadline in order to count all of the
152. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
153. Id. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). The delegation of
authority to the Secretary of State took place pursuant to section 97.012(1) of the Florida
Statutes, and the delegation to the state circuit courts pursuant to sections 102.168(1) and
102.168(8) of the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.012(1) (West 2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 102.168(1), 102.168(8) (West 2000) (amended 2002).
154. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Idl at 117-18.
158. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000)
[hereinafter Harris I].
159. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 117-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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votes and incorporate a full manual count in a certified total. 160 The
concurring Justices reinforced the idea that the Secretary of State,
following the provisions set forth by the state legislature, is the final
arbiter of the meaning and enforcement of the laws governing election
administration.16 ' The concurrence made a point of criticizing the
Florida Supreme Court's lack of deference to the Secretary of State's
decisions, as well as the deadlines set by the Florida legislature and even
its own earlier decisions. 162
Continuing to dismantle the Florida Supreme Court's decision,
Rehnquist's concurrence pointed out that the Florida Supreme Court
"plainly departed from the legislative scheme" in ordering a recount
during the contest phase of the election, when Justice Rehnquist felt that
"Florida statutory law cannot reasonably be thought to require the
counting of improperly marked ballots. '" 163 Rehnquist asserted that such
remedial measures after the election are or should be unnecessary, 164 as
Florida statute provides that each precinct advise voters "on how to
properly cast a vote,"'165 have a model of the voting machine it uses
available for preparatory practice voting, 166 and prepare a sample ballot
for each voting booth. 167 Furthermore, the punchcard ballots were
accompanied by an admonition to voters to be vigilant with regard to
eliminating all chad, 68 and Rehnquist rejected the Florida Supreme
Court's efforts to order the recounting of all of these ballots:
No reasonable person would call it "an error in the vote
tabulation," Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.166(5) (Supp.2001), or
a "rejection of ... legal votes," § 102.168(3)(c), when
electronic or electromechanical equipment performs
precisely in the manner designed, and fails to count
those ballots that are not marked in the manner that these
voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify.
The scheme that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion
attributes to the legislature is one in which machines are
160. Id. at 118.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 118-19.
164. Id. at 119.
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 101.46 (1992).
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 101.5611 (Supp. 2002).
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 101.46 (2002).
168. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105, 119; see also Brief on the merits of Katherine Harris,
Sec'y of State, at 2000 U.S. Briefs 949 (Lexis-Nexis) at 10-11, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
required to be "capable of correctly counting votes," §
101.5606(4), but which nonetheless regularly produces
elections in which legal votes are predictably not
tabulated, so that in close elections manual recounts are
regularly required. This is of course absurd. 169
The concurrence then explained that the Secretary of State "is
authorized by law to issue binding interpretations of the Election Code,"
effectively granting to an executive agency the unmitigated and
unreviewable authority to interpret state law. 170 The concurrence called
Secretary of State Harris's interpretation "reasonable," while maligning
the opinion of a unanimous Florida Supreme Court in the first election
case, Harris I, as "peculiar." 171 Justice Rehnquist explained that the
Secretary of State's opinions were the equivalent of the legislative
scheme, and the court erred in differing with Secretary Harris.
172
Finally, the concurrence explained that, beyond overstepping the
bounds of administrative procedures for elections, the Florida Supreme
Court's proposed remedy of manually counting votes to ensure accuracy
of the final count was made impossible due to the time limitations
imposed on the certification of electors. 173 The Court was concerned not
with achieving a fair count of the votes as asserted by the Florida
Supreme Court majority in the second decision it issued 174 but rather
achieving a certifiable vote count before the so-called "safe-harbor"
provision175 protecting the legitimacy of each state's electors. 176 The
concurrence interpreted Florida's statutory scheme as requiring a final
certification prior to the expiration of the "safe-harbor" provision and
explained that, "the remedy prescribed by the Supreme Court of Florida
cannot be deemed an 'appropriate' one as of December 8," because it
"significantly departed from the statutory framework in place on
November 7," as the Court and Secretary of State Harris interpreted it,
"and authorized open-ended further proceedings which could not be
completed by December 12, thereby preventing a final determination by
that date." 77
169. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
170. Id. at 119-20 (citing Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d
840, 844 (Fla. 1993)).
171. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 120-21.
174. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) [hereinafter Harris II].
175. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
176. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 121 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
177. Id. at 122.
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The Dissenting Opinions
The concurring opinion of Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia, written in
support of the per curiam opinion on their behalf and that of non-writing
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, provoked a firestorm among the four
dissenting Justices, each of whom wrote a dissenting opinion. These
opinions picked apart Justice Rehnquist's opinion and the per curiam
opinion, generally argued that the Court should not have adjudicated the
case and that the Florida counties should have been given the time to
complete a final contest phase manual recount under a uniform standard.
Justice Stevens' Opinion
Stevens characterized the issue presented as a question arising
"about the meaning of state laws," and that it is the "settled practice [of
the United States Supreme Court] to accept the opinions of the highest
courts of the States as providing the final answers" regarding an
interpretation of state laws. 178  Stevens unequivocally anchored his
dissent in the principle that the issues surrounding the election of 2000
in Florida were issues of state law interpretation, more properly decided
by a state supreme court, not the Federal one. 179 According to Stevens'
dissent, any "federal questions that ultimately emerged in this case are
not substantial." 180 Stevens referred to McPherson v. Blacker, 81 in
which the Court held that actions required or forbidden to be done by a
state through its legislature are to be reviewed under their state's
constitution, implicitly by their state supreme court.1 82  Stevens
explained that "nothing in Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the
state legislature from the restraints in the State Constitution that created
it.'' 183 Also, the Florida Legislature's decision not to exempt the Florida
election code from the rest of the code, according to Stevens, displayed
"that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in
Presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving [all
other types of] electoral disputes." 184 Justice Stevens concluded that
"[t]he Florida Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction
178. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id
180. Id.
181. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
182. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 and Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932)).
183. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id
therefore was wholly consistent with, and indeed contemplated by, the
grant of authority in Article 11."185 Stevens pointed out that the Court
has never before questioned the standard by which a state determines
whether a vote has been legally cast and how it will be counted.
1 86
Stevens charged that the majority's decision oversteps the authority of
the Court. 1
87
Stevens asserted that the Bush v. Gore holding is applicable to future
cases in other states because the Florida standard is similar to the
standard applied by a large majority of the states, 188 either as an "intent
of the voter" 189 or an "impossible to determine the elector's choice"190
standard. Stevens further pointed out that the majority's decision in
Bush v. Gore has the impact of negating all recent history of election
administration, eliminating the ability of state officials to govern the
administration of federal elections in their states. 191 If the majority's
decision were taken to heart by courts and legislatures around the
country, "Florida's decision to leave to each county the determination of
what balloting system to employ.., might run afoul of equal protection.
So, too, might the similar decisions of the vast majority of state
legislatures to delegate to local authorities certain decisions with respect
to voting systems and ballot designs."' 192
Stevens concluded his dissent by pointing out that that the majority
185. Id
186. Id at 124-25.
187. Id
188. Id at 125 n.2.
189. Id. Footnote 2 summarizes:
The following States use an "intent of the voter" standard: (standard for
canvassing write-in votes); (standard for absentee ballots, including three
conclusive presumptions); Mass. Gen. Laws § 70E (1991) (applying
standard to Presidential primaries); (Cum. Supp. 1998) (looking to voter's
intent where there is substantial compliance with statutory requirements);
(standard for write-in votes), § 20A-4-105(6)(a) (standard for mechanical
ballots); (standard for write-in votes); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-14-104 (1999).
Id.
190. Id Footnote 2 summarizes:
The following States employ a standard in which a vote is counted unless it
is "impossible to determine the elector's [or voter's] choice": (1992);
(standard for rejecting ballot); Cal. Elec. Code Ann. § 15154(c) (West Supp.
2000); (standard for paper ballots), § 1-7-508(2) (standard for electronic
ballots); (standard for primaries), § 5/17-16 (standard for general elections);
(not counting votes if "elector's choice cannot be determined").
Id.
191. Id. at 126.
192. Id
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itself, by its own reasoning, should have concluded that "the appropriate
course of action would be to remand to allow more specific procedures
for implementing the legislature's uniform general standard to be
established."' 9 3  Stevens lamented the fact that the majority, acting
solely "[i]n the interests of finality . . . effectively orders the
disenfranchisement of an unknown number of voters whose ballots
reveal their intent-and are therefore legal votes under state law-but
were for some reason rejected by ballot-counting machines." 194 Stevens
pointed to the 1960 Hawaii event, in which two slates of Presidential
Electors were certified, each one after the expiration of the "safe harbor"
provision, and the Congress chose to adopt the slate of electors certified
on January 4, 1961, well after the deadline the per curiam adopted. 195
Stevens ended by explaining that the administrative procedures set
forth prior to the election functioned properly and should have been left
to function on their own by the conservative justices, in an effort to
comply with the Florida "legislature's intent to leave no legally cast vote
uncounted."' 196 Stevens reiterated that "[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."' 197 Stevens
left a remarkable and lasting impression to his condemnation of the
majority by explaining that, to sustain Bush's "federal assault on the
Florida election procedures," the majority of the Court must possess a
"lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges
who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed.
Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit." 198
Justice Souter's Opinion
Justice Souter's opinion1 99 is less polemic than Justice Stevens' but
no less fervent in support of the Florida Supreme Court. Souter stated in
the first sentence of his dissent that "[t]he Court should not have
reviewed either Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board20° or this
193. Id. at 126-27.
194. Id. at 127.
195. Id. at 127 n.5 (citing Josephson & Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J.
LEGIS. 145, 166 n.154 (1996)).
196. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 127-28.
197. Id. at 128 n.7 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
198. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 128.
199. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (vacating Florida Supreme Court order to certify post-deadline
vote totals and requesting that the Florida Supreme Court clarify the relationship between
the Florida Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the law of the State of Florida
case, and should not have stopped Florida's attempt to recount all
undervote ballots by issuing a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's
orders during the period of this review .... "201 Souter advocated an
approach more in line with the Rehnquist Court's more traditional
federalist tendencies 20 2 and rejected the idea that political questions such
as the one presented in Bush v. Gore merited any special consideration
by the Court.203
Souter narrowed his opinion to three issues and remarked that "[n]one
of these issues is difficult to describe or to resolve." 204 Souter's issues
were:
[First] whether the State Supreme Court's interpretation
of the statute providing for a contest of the state election
results somehow violates 3 U.S.C. § 5; [Second] whether
that court's construction of the state statutory provisions
governing contests impermissibly changes a state law
from what the State's legislature has provided, in
violation of Article II, § 1, cl. 2, of the National
Constitution; and [Third] whether the manner of
interpreting markings on disputed ballots failing to cause
machines to register votes for President (the undervote
ballots) violates the equal protection or due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
205
Each of these are issues of Federalism that Souter felt were best left to
the state court to resolve,20 6 but each also has important administrative
law implications, most notably the third question.
In addressing the third issue, Souter asserted that the question was
whether the process in place at the time of the election and the
procedures that took place after the election violated the equal protection
clause through maladministration of election laws. 20 7 The per curiam
unequivocally condemned the procedures undertaken after the
regarding the legislature's responsibility for voting regulations).
201. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
202. E.J. Dionne, Jr., So Much for States' Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35,
reprinted in E.J. DIONNE, JR. & WILLIAM KRISTOL, EDS., BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES
AND THE COMMENTARY 287 (2001).
203. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 129-30.
205 Id.
206. Id. at 129.
207. Id. at 133-34.
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election, 20 8 and the Rehnquist concurrence used very harsh language to
condemn the actions taken by the Gore campaign to disrupt the
administrative work undertaken by the Secretary of State. 209 Souter only
begrudgingly addressed the administrative law issues, explaining that
the recount process could have been dealt with properly at the state level
had the Supreme Court given the process an appropriate amount of
time. 210 Souter explained that, had the process not worked itself out at
the state level, "it could have been considered by the Congress. ' 211
Souter encapsulates the central equal protection issue as whether
"unjustifiably disparate standards are applied in different electoral
jurisdictions to otherwise identical facts. '212  Different types of
mechanisms for voting seem to be acceptable under established law
even though they result in a disparity among local jurisdictions in
accuracy and effectiveness. 213  However, Souter sees a critical and
unacceptable arbitrary and disparate treatment of ballots out of the same
voting mechanism once the post-election recounts commenced. 214
Souter "can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these
differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights,"
explaining that "[t]he differences appear wholly arbitrary." 215
Souter therefore feels that the administrative process has serious
faults, and that a uniform standard for counting the ballots must be
established. 216 He further explains that the responsibility of rectifying
the situation lay most properly with the courts of Florida where he
would remand the case "with instructions to establish uniform standards
for evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted differing
treatments." 217 Though he seems to agree with the majority, Souter
established his independence by declaring that he feels that Florida's
courts could comply with the needs of the Equal Protection doctrine for
fairness and a procedure that is not arbitrary within the amount of time
between the Court's decision and the date of the meeting of the electors
208. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-09 (2000).
209. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
210. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
211. Id at 133.
212. Id. at 134.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 134-35.
217. Id.
for president, a time span of six days. 218 Souter concludes by reiterating
his theme of allowing the state the time and opportunity to rectify its
own situation without imposing federal constraints that impede its
ability to operate: "There is no justification for denying the State the
opportunity to try to count all disputed ballots now.
219
Justice Ginsburg's Opinion
Justice Ginsburg's angry opinion is also firmly rooted in ideas of
federalism, urging along with Justice Souter that Florida be granted the
opportunity to fix its own failed process. She begins by accusing Chief
Justice Rehnquist of failing to respect "the state high court's province to
say what the State's Election Code means, The Chief Justice maintains
that Florida's Supreme Court has veered so far from the ordinary
practice of judicial review that what it did cannot properly be called
judging. ' 220 Ginsburg emphatically states:
[D]isagreement with the Florida court's interpretation of
its own State's law does not warrant the conclusion that
the justices of that court have legislated. There is no
cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high
court have done less than "their mortal best to discharge
their oath of office," and no cause to upset their reasoned
interpretation of Florida law. 221
Ginsburg supports her position that the Court properly defers to
statutory interpretations in several situations including the realm of
administrative law:
[W]hen reviewing challenges to administrative agencies'
interpretations of laws they implement, we defer to the
agencies unless their interpretation violates "the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." We do so
in the face of the declaration in Article I of the United
States Constitution that "All legislative Powers herein
218. Id at 135. The time span is from December 12, 2000, the date of the decision, to
December 18, 2000, the date of the meeting of the electors in Washington, D.C. Id The
electors for president did meet in their respective states and successfully concluded their task
in an uneventful manner on December 18, 2000. "Amid Fanfare and Ceremony, Electoral
College Members Cast Votes," at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/18/
electoral.feature/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
219. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221. Id at 136 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981)).
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granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States." Surely the Constitution does not call upon us to
pay more respect to a federal administrative agency's
construction of federal law than to a state high court's
interpretation of its own state's law. And not
uncommonly, we let stand state-court interpretations of
federal law with which we might disagree. 222
Ginsburg's ultimate point is that, along with being an issue of
administrative law which might qualify for deference under traditional
notions, 223 the decisions of Florida's Supreme Court and elections
administrators are issues of state laws and interpretation most properly
left to the states and not the federal judiciary. Ginsburg reiterates a
statement made by the Court in an earlier case that "there is no intrinsic
reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to [federal law]
than his neighbor in the state courthouse. ' 224 Ginsburg even cites to a
case in which the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois Supreme Court
decision which recognized the waiver of federal constitutional rights.
Ginsburg explained that "the state court's declaration 'should bind us
unless so unfair or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a
federal right as to obstruct it.'' 225 Ginsburg similarly cites to Gurley v.
Rhoden,226 where the Court declared that a state supreme court "is the
final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes," and "[w]hen a
state court has made its own definitive determination as to the operating
incidence.... [w]e give this finding great weight in determining the
natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute's
reasonable interpretation it will be deemed conclusive." 227  In fact,
Ginsburg refers to the Court as "an outsider" that should certify
questions of state law "to a state's highest court, even when federal
rights are at stake. '228
222. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984)) (emphasis in original).
223. See, e.g., Naaman Asir Fiola, Christensen v. Harris County: Pumping Chevron For
All It's Worth- Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference, 21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 151 (Spring 2001).
224. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 136-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 494 n. 35 (1976) (citations omitted)).
225. Id. at 138 (citing Cent. Union Tel. Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925)).
226.421 U.S. 200 (1975).
227. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 138 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gurley v. Rhoden,
421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975)).
228. Id. (citations omitted).
Ginsburg's implicit point is that the Supreme Court of the United
States should not be in the business of interpreting state law and telling
states how to operate their state administrative functions. She criticizes
the cases Rehnquist uses to illustrate his assertion that deference does
not need to be given to a state supreme court as "hardly comparable to
the situation here," and reiterates that "this case involves nothing close
to the kind of recalcitrance by a state high court that warrants
extraordinary action by this Court. 229
Ginsburg returns to the primary principle of all the dissenters'
arguments; that each vote that was legally cast be counted by a fair
mechanism. 230  She explains that the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of the legislative history of the Florida Election Code
yielded a reasonable conclusion that should be recognized by the Court
as the state's official position.231 She criticized the majority for not
recognizing that, though they view the legislature as the final arbiter of
election law, "in a republican government, the judiciary. .. construe[s]
the legislature's enactments. ' 232 She accuses the Chief Justice, by his
concurring opinion, of trying to disrupt Florida's government and
administrative procedures: "By holding that Article II requires our
revision of a state court's construction of state laws in order to protect
one organ of the state from another, The Chief Justice contradicts the
basic principle that a State may organize itself as it sees fit."
233
Ginsburg also writes, if a state court departed from a proper
interpretation of law, it would be the duty of Congress, not the Supreme
Court, to constrain the state from acting outside its bounds. 234 Ginsburg
explains her own position by emphatically stating, "Article II does not
call for the scrutiny undertaken by this Court," and "Federal courts defer
to state high courts' interpretations of their state's own law. ' 235 She
refers to these principles as "the core of federalism, on which we all
agree. '236
Ginsburg suggests that the conservative members of the Court
departed from their normal federalist tendencies in order to rule in favor
of the Bush position, remarking that, "[w]ere the other Members of this
229. Id. at 13941.
230. Id at 141.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 139-41.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 141 n.2.
235. Id. at 142.
236. Id.
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Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual
sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court."
2 3 7
With regards to the equal protection claim pursued by Bush, Ginsburg
explains:
[I]deally, perfection would be the appropriate standard for
judging the recount. But we live in an imperfect world .... I
cannot agree that the recount adopted by the Florida court,
flawed as it may be, would yield a result any less fair or precise
than the certification that preceded that recount. '238
Ginsburg agrees with Justice Souter that the state should have the
ability to decide whether and how it wants to resolve a dispute provided
for in its statutes, and that the majority improperly short-circuited the
vote counting by issuing a stay on December 9, prior to hearing oral
arguments in Bush v. Gore.2 39 Ginsburg condemns the majority for
inappropriately relying "on its own judgment about the practical realities
of implementing a recount, not the judgment of those much closer to the
process." 240  Ginsburg ends her opinion by restating her interest in
seeing the process of election administration through according to the
Florida Election Code as properly interpreted by the Florida Supreme
Court, as opposed to the United States Supreme Court allowing the
"untested prophecy" of a constitutionally inadequate recount to "decide
the Presidency of the United States. '241
Justice Breyer's Opinion
Justice Breyer succinctly summarizes at the outset of his opinion in
simple terms: "The Court was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to
grant a stay. It should now vacate that stay and permit the Florida
Supreme Court to decide whether the recount should resume. '242 He
then explains that, aside from "the absence of a uniform, specific
standard to guide the recounts . the federal legal questions presented
237. Id. at 142-43.
238. Id. at 143.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 144.
242. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
... are insubstantial. ' 243 Breyer points out that the majority departs
from the widely accepted and uniform standard of the "clear intent of
the voter" in order to enact a new "uniform subsidiary standard.". 244
Breyer agrees with the majority that a uniform standard needs to be
determined, but suggests that this is an administrative issue to be worked
out by the state government entities charged with this responsibility.245
Breyer states that "there is no justification for the majority's remedy,
which is simply to reverse the lower court and halt the recount entirely,"
but rather, the case should have been remanded with instructions to the
Florida Supreme Court to establish a single uniform standard and direct
a recount of all undercounted ballots in the state of Florida.246 He
criticizes the majority for making factual findings not based on facts in
the record, such as the fact, asserted by the majority, that Secretary of
State Harris lacked time to review and approve of the use of equipment
for separating undervotes. 247 "The majority," explains Breyer, "finds
fact outside of the record on matters that state courts are in a far better
position to address," most notably matters relating to the administration
of elections procedures. 248
Breyer also remarks, along with Justice Stevens, that the principles
adopted by the majority seem to implicitly recognize and condemn the
disadvantage to voters in jurisdictions using punchcard machines:
Thus, in a system that allows counties to use different
types of voting systems, voters already arrive at the polls
with an unequal chance that their votes will be counted.
I do not see how the fact that this results from counties'
selection of different voting machines rather than a court
order makes the outcome any more fair. Nor do I
understand why the Florida Supreme Court's recount
order, which helps to redress this inequity, must be
entirely prohibited based on a deficiency that could
easily be remedied. 249
Justice Breyer's dissent seems to imply that the entire system has to
be either fair with some inherent problems or wholly unfair and in need
of a complete overhaul that removes control of the election process from
243. Id. at 144-45.
244. Id. at 145.
245. Id. at 145-46.
246. Id. at 146.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
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the province and authority of state administrators. He criticizes the
majority for laying all responsibility for the administration of elections
at the feet of the legislature, saying, that "neither the text of Article II
itself nor the only case the concurrence cites that interprets Article II,
McPherson v. Blacker, leads to the conclusion that Article I grants
unlimited power to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional
limitations, to select the manner of appointing electors. 2 50
Addressing the implications of the per curiam and especially the
concurring opinion with regard to the administration of elections in the
future, Justice Breyer explained that the "safe harbor" provision is one
that, prior to Bush v. Gore, state elections officials could take advantage
of, and that state legislatures could have adopted, but that the majority
has improperly turned it into "a mandate that trumps other statutory
provisions and overrides the intent that the legislature did express. '251
Breyer addresses the three concerns the majority expressed about the
manner in which the "Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair
reading required, in violation of Article 11:"252
[W]hat precisely is the distortion? Apparently, it has
three elements. First, the Florida court, in its earlier
opinion, changed the election certification date from
November 14 to November 26. Second, the Florida
court ordered a manual recount of "undercounted"
ballots that could not have been fully completed by the
December 12 "safe harbor" deadline. Third, the Florida
court, in the opinion now under review, failed to give
adequate deference to the determinations of canvassing
boards and the Secretary. 253
Breyer criticizes the majority for "second-guess[ing] the way in
which the state court resolved a plain conflict in the language of
different statutes. ' 254 Breyer then explains that election administration
is best left to the states, as the state courts were perfectly capable of
conducting a recount under the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation. 255 Regarding the third "distortion," Breyer writes that the
Florida statutes specify that "the 'grounds for contesting an election'
250. Id. at 148 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)).
251. Id. at 149.
252. Id. (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115-16 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
253. Id
254. Id.
255. See Id. at 150.
Spin 202Bs .Gr
include the 'rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to ... place in
doubt the result of the election."' 25 6 Breyer disputes the majority's
contention that the state's chief election administrator, Secretary of State
Katherine Harris, maintains broad discretion where the statutes are
subject to broad interpretation. The majority interprets the statute as
favoring the count of as many votes as can be counted. 257 Breyer points
out that the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that "the term 'legal
vote' means a vote recorded on a ballot that clearly reflects what the
voter intended ... differs from the conclusion of the Secretary. '258
However, Breyer notes that "nothing in Florida law requires the Florida
Supreme Court to accept as determinative the Secretary's view on such
a matter," suggesting that a court adjudicating an election issue has the
same administrative jurisdiction as the state's election administration
after an election has gone awry.259
Breyer reiterates the minority's concern that the Court should never
have taken the case, and seems to provide a generally applicable warning
to future election combatants when he says, "[o]f course, the selection of
the President is of fundamental national importance. But that
importance is political, not legal. And this Court should resist the
temptation unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where
doing so threatens to determine the outcome of the election. 260
Breyer explains that the proper method of adjudicating elections is
through the state courts, as elections are administered by states and the
American "road-map [of election administration] foresees resolution of
electoral disputes by state courts."' 261 He likens the Supreme Court's
intervention into the 2000 election dispute to the manner in which
Justice Joseph P. Bradley's single vote gave the election of 1876 to
Rutherford B. Hayes after the power to adjudicate the election was
removed from Congress to a special Electoral Commission. 262 Breyer
concludes by reiterating that the Court should not have gotten involved
in the 2000 election, because election administration and the
interpretation of state election laws should be adjudicated by the states,
without the heavy hand of the Supreme Court. 263
256. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3) (West Supp. 2001)).
257. Id. at 150-51.
258. Id. at 151 (citing Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 (Fla. 2000)).
259. See id.
260. Id. at 153.
261. Id. (italics in original).
262. Id. at 156; see supra notes 48-59.
263. See id. at 157-58.
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Final Adjudication on Remand to the Florida Supreme Court
In the final adjudication of Bush v. Gore, the Florida Supreme Court
recognized that the United States Supreme Court found that the lack of
specific standards for recounting the votes rendered any attempted
recount a violation of the equal protection clause.264 The Florida court
explained that, with the statutory deadline of December 12 having
passed on the day of the Supreme Court's decision, the task of the
recount "could not possibly be met. ' 265 Finally, the Florida justices
concluded that, "the development of a specific, uniform standard
necessary to ensure equal application and to secure the fundamental
right to vote throughout the State of Florida should be left to the body
we believe best equipped to study and address it, the Legislature. '266
VI. THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD
"The historical primary of state voting laws ... accounted for the
before-the-fact opinion of most commentators that the Supreme Court
would not decisively intervene in the case. ' 267 However, as seen before
the release of the Supreme Court's opinion, "[t]he most obvious
alternative [to a reinterpretation of Florida's election law by the
Supreme Court] is equal protection analysis - more precisely, the fact
that the vote counts mandated by the Florida Supreme Court would
follow no intelligible, fair procedure. '268
One commentator explains that the holding of Bush v. Gore "sets
forth a very simple, noncomplex proposition - that if there are varying
standards to count the votes, this violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 269 One conservative supporter of Bush, in
criticizing the majority and Rehnquist's concurring opinion, stated that
the ruling's equal protection standard seemed to mandate "uniform
national standards," and that "inter-county and intra-county differences
in election procedures, which are common in every state... [now
264. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 330.
268. Michael Greve, The Equal-Protection Card: The Worst Grounds May Be the Best,
National Review Online, December 11, 2000, reprinted in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES
AND THE COMMENTARY 260, 261 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Kristol eds., Brookings
Institution Press 2001).
269. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME COURT
UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT, 59 (Thunder's Mouth
Press/Nation Books 2001).
require] strict scrutiny from federal courts. ' 270 It seems that, despite an
attempt by the Court to limit the application of the principles it set forth
in Bush v. Gore to the facts of a presidential election, a new standard
was set forth, and should be applied in future cases addressing the
counting of votes, that mandates the equal tallying of votes. Though it
may not have been intended and was certainly not foreseen by the
founders of this country that the right to vote would be extended to
every citizen, including initial disenfranchises, women, Blacks, and non-
property holders, the vote is now in the hands of hundreds of millions of
Americans. Having extended the right to vote to all of these people over
two hundred years, the nation's leaders have now had to address the
method of counting those votes. The Supreme Court has chimed in to
register its discontent with the way in which votes are cast and counted,
explaining that the disparity in counting violates the right of the people
to be treated equally. An extension of this principle of equality to vote
counting now seems to mandate that all people who cast ballots in an
election be provided the same technology with which to register their
vote.
Lawsuits have already been filed with attorneys relying on Bush v.
Gore in their pleadings and judges relying on it in their holdings. Most
of the cases brought in the state courts have been used to challenge the
legality of the machinery used to conduct elections. 271 The American
Civil Liberties Union, not often a friend of the concurring Justices,
explained that the abiding principle of Bush v. Gore was that "every
vote must be given equal weight under the Constitution .... The
ACLU and other civil rights organizations are now taking the Supreme
Court at its word. '272 According to Richard Hasen, a law professor at
the University of California at Los Angeles, the legacy of Bush v. Gore
is the creation of "a third level of equality" in election cases:
Various amendments to the Constitution and Supreme
Court cases decided by the Warren Court established the
first level of equality, requiring that if a jurisdiction
holds an election, every citizen, adult resident has the
right to vote in that election. The Warren Court ...
270. John J. DiJulio, Jr., Equal Protection Run Amok: Conservatives Will Come to Regret
the Court's Rationale for Bush v. Gore, The Weekly Standard, Dec. 25, 2000, reprinted in
BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 321, 322 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. and
William Kristol eds., Brookings Institution Press 2001).
271. B. J. Palermo, Bush v. Gore Prompts Voter-Access Suits by Civil Rights Groups,
BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., May 23, 2001 at 9.
272. Id
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established the second level of equality - the right to an
equally weighted vote. In Bush v. Gore, the Court ...
move[d] to a third level of equality - equality in the
procedures and mechanisms used for voting. 273
It is clear, then, that the lasting impression of Bush v. Gore is that the
mechanics of elections, currently decided by each county, must be
uniform or at least equal in order for an election to pass constitutional
muster. In fact, "[t]here's nothing in the equal protection clause that
limits its application to presidential or even federal elections ... manual
recounts without clearly defined standards are now suspect in every
election in America. ' '274 "The Supreme Court has called into question
not only the manual-recount procedure adopted by the legislature of
Florida but our entire decentralized system of voting - in which
different counties use different technologies to count different ballots
designed differently and cast at different hours of the day. '275 To cope
with the rapid changes in election law and administration, each state has
a commission or department that is normally tasked with handling
election administration. 276 In the wake of Bush v. Gore, however, the
273. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 392-93 (2001) (citations omitted).
274. Marcia Coyle, Gauging Bush v. Gore Fallout: Will Equal Protection Language
Open a Can of Electoral Worms?, The NAT. L. J., Dec. 25, 2000-Jan. 1, 2001, at A4
(quoting Vice Dean Michael Dorf of Columbia University School of Law).
275. Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, The New Republic, Dec. 25,
2000, reprinted in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 311, 314 (E.J.
Dionne, Jr. and William Kristol eds., Brookings Institution Press 2001).
276. See, e.g. National Association of Secretaries of State Index of Secretary of State
Web Sites, at http://www.nass.org/sos/sosflags.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Office of the
Secretary of State of the State of Alabama, Elections Division, at http://www.sos.state.al.us/
election/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); State of Alaska Division of Elections, at
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/homepage.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002);
Arizona Elections Services Division, at http://www.sosaz.com/election/ (last visited Feb. 7,
2002); Arkansas Secretary of State Elections Website, at http://www.sosweb.state.ar.us/
elect.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); California Secretary of State- Elections Division, at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Colorado
Department of State Elections Division at http./www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/
mainl.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2002); Connecticut Secretary of State Election Services
Division, at http//www.sots.state.ct.us/ElectionsDivision/Electionndex.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002); State of Delaware Department of Elections, at http://www.state.de.us/election/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, at
http://www.dcboee.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Florida Department of State Division of
Elections, at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/ (last visited on Feb. 7, 2002); Georgia Secretary
of State Elections Division, at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/ (last visited Feb. 7,
2002); State of Hawaii Office of Elections, at http://www.hawaii.gov/elections/ (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002); Idaho Secretary of State Election Division, at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/
elect/eleindex.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Illinois State Board of Elections, at
http://www.elections.state.il.us/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2002); Indiana Secretary of State
Elections Division, at http://www.state.in.us/sos/elections/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Iowa
Secretary of State Voter Center, at http://www.sos.state.ia.us/elections/electinfo.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2002); Kansas Secretary of State- Elections, at http://www.kssos.org/
elewelc.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Commonwealth of Kentucky Elections Home Page,
at http://www.kysos.com/INDEX/main/elecdiv.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Louisiana
Secretary of State Elections Division, at http://www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Maine Department of Secretary of State Bureau of
Corporations, Elections, and Commissions- Department of Elections, at
http://www.state.me.us/sos/cec/elec/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Maryland State Board of
Elections, at http://www.elections.state.md.us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Elections Division, at http://www.state.ma.us/secele/
eleidx.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Michigan Secretary of State- Elections, at
http://www.sos.state.mi.us/election/elect.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Minnesota
Secretary of State- Elections, at http'J/www.sos.state.mn.us/election/index.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002); Mississippi Secretary of State Elections Home Page, at
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/elections/elections.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Missouri
Secretary of State- Elections, at http://mosl.sos.state.mo.us/sos-elec/soselec.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002); Montana Secretary of State Election Information, at
http.//sos.state.mt.us/css/ELB/Contents.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Nebraska Secretary of
State Election Administration, at http://www.nol.org/home/SOS/Elections/election.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2002); Nevada Secretary of State Elections Division, at
http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); New Hampshire Secretary of
State Elections Division, at http://webster.state.nh.us/sos/elections.htm (Feb. 7, 2002); State
of New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety Division of Elections at
http://www.state.nj.uslps/elections/electionshome.htnml (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); New
Mexico Office of the Secretary of State Bureau of Elections, at http://www.sos.state.nm.us/
elect.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); New York State Board of Elections, at
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); North Carolina State Board of
Elections, at http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); North Dakota Secretary
of State-Elections, at http://www.state.nd.us/sec/Elections/Elections.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2002); Ohio Secretary of State Election Services, at http://www.state.oh.us/sos/
electionservices.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Oklahoma State Election Board, at
http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Oregon Secretary of
State Elections Division, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/elechp.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2002); Pennsylvania Department of State- Commissions, Elections & Legislation Election
Information Site, at http://www.dos.state.pa.us/bcel/elections/elections.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002); State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation Office of the Secretary of
State Elections Division, at httpJ//155.212.254.78/ELECTIONS/electionsdivision.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2002); South Carolina Election Commission, at http://www.state.sc.us/scsec/
(last visited Feb. 7, 2002); South Dakota Elections Information, at http://www.state.sd.us/
sos/Elections%20home%20page'htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Tennessee Secretary of
State Division of Elections, at http'/www.state.tn.us/sos/election.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2002); Texas Secretary of State Elections Division, at http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/
index.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Utah State Elections Office, at
http://elections.utah.gov/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); State of Vermont Office of the Secretary
of State Elections and Campaign Finance Division, at http://www.vermont-
elections.org/soshome.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Virginia State Board of Elections, at
http://www.sbe.state.va.us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Washington State Election
Information, at http'/www.vote.wa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); West Virginia Secretary
of State, at http://www.wvsos.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Wisconsin State Elections
Board, at http://elections.state.wi.us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); Wyoming Secretary of State
Election Administration, at http://soswy.state.wy.us/election/election.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2002).
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National Association of Secretaries of State adopted a resolution
regarding the reform of election law across the country, 277 and many
states have established special task forces or set forth plans for the
purpose of reassessing the manner in which they run elections. 278
VII. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS- A NATIONALLY
UNIFORM ADMINISTRATION?
In Bush v. Gore, a majority of the Supreme Court made clear their
distaste for varying standards for counting votes cast in Florida counties.
But it is not clear from their decision how the Justices propose to solve
the problem of varying standards for counting the votes cast in each
county in a Presidential election. It is therefore left to the administrative
agencies governing each state's elections procedures to analyze the
decision and define an equal protection standard with which they feel
comfortable complying.
Within months of the collapse of the electoral system in November of
2000, commentators began to look forward to how elections officials
could recover from the debacle. State officials failed in 2000 by placing
in the field "[u]nder-trained election workers [who] were sorely tested
by massive voter turnout and malfunctioning equipment. '279
Undoubtedly, in order to pass the new equal protection standard, State
Secretaries of State must establish:
[C]lear, objective standards for counting votes-standards
that:
" Are well articulated and uniform throughout the state;
" Do not require interpretation as you go along;
" Are tailored to the different types of voting equipment
in use;
* Are consistent with the instructions voters are given;
277. National Association of Secretaries of State Election Reform Resolution, Adopted
Feb. 6, 2001, available at http://www.nass.org/pubs/pubs-electionres.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2002).
278. See, e.g. National Association of Secretaries of State Index of State Election Reform
Resources, at http://www.nass.org/Issues/issueselections.htrl (last visited on Feb. 7, 2002).
The website has various election reform statements and plans from a number of states,
including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. The NASS website is
updated as states release election reform plans and more states may release plans or
statements after the printing of this article.
279. William S. Morrow, Jr., News from the Circuit: Charting the Course of Election
Reform After Bush v. Gore, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws 22 (Summer 2001).
and
* Include procedures for resolving disputes in a precise
and uniform manner.280
Also, state elections rules and codes "will need to be supplemented to
comply with the court's decision .... [T]his may mean creating a
statewide canvassing board .. . -"281 Another task of state legislatures
will be "to enumerate what qualifies as a vote on a system-by-system
basis" prior to elections, in a generally applicable manner.
282
In fact, this process has already begun in the state that raised the
nation's awareness as to the deficiencies of election administration by
the states, as Florida Governor Jeb Bush, on May 10, 2001, enacted the
Florida Election Reform Act of 2001,283 which:
[P]rohibits the use of punchcard voting systems;
provides funding for upgrading county voting systems;
requires a uniform ballot design for each voting system;
provides standards for equipment testing; substantially
modifies the standards and procedures for manual
recounts; provides for poll worker recruitment and
training; and funds a statewide voter registration
database. 284
Writing for the American Bar Association, William S. Morrow
forecasts, "[i]f other States follow Florida's example, the chances of
repeating a near- Presidential election crisis will diminish. If not, then as
Yogi Berra would say, 'It's d6jA vu all over again. ' ' 285 Indeed, it would
be to each State Secretary of State's benefit to review the election
process codified in their state and make sure that they rectify any
possible post-election inequities in vote-tallying. States should also take
prophylactic measures, such as selecting a uniform method of casting
ballots, to make sure that differing methods of voting, such as punchcard
and optical scan, do not create differing levels of statistical anomalies
that could support claims such as the Bush campaign's. Most
importantly, each state needs to develop a uniform method of counting
cast ballots after an election so as to ensure that each properly cast ballot
is counted in a meaningful manner. Should the states not be able to
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id (quoting statements made by George Terwilliger, an attorney for the Bush team
during the Florida legal battle).
283. 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2001-40 (West).
284. Morrow, Jr., supra note 279 at 22-23.
285. Id.
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successfully achieve this uniformity, voices will be raised in
Washington, D.C. and around the country for the Federal Government to
step in and set forth uniform standards for election administration. 286
Will this task be completed in time for what is sure to be another close
election in 2004? Only time will tell.
286. Proposals for Electoral College Reform: H.J. Res. 28 and H.J. Res. 43 Before the
House Subcomm. on the Constitution, Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1997) (citing
testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Professor, Yale Law School), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/222315.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
